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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT
People v. Buchanan'
(decided June 6, 2008)
Ingvue Buchanan was convicted of second-degree murder, af-
ter a jury trial, during which he was physically restrained by a stun
belt that he was required to wear under his clothes.2 Buchanan ap-
pealed to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, which ad-
dressed "whether the use of a stun belt that is not visible to the jury is
subject to the same judicial scrutiny as other forms of [visible] physi-
cal restraint[s]. 3 More specifically, the court addressed whether the
use of any restraint on the defendant violated his rights under the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution 4 or the New York
Constitution. 5 The appellate division affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion, holding that "the use of any type of physical restraint requires
the court to make the same individualized security determination re-
quired for the use of physical restraints that are visible.",6 However,
the court concluded that the defendant's right to due process was not
violated when he was required to wear a stun belt during trial.7
859 N.Y.S.2d 791 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2008).
2 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
3 Id. This is an issue of first impression in New York. Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states, in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law."
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Buchanan was ordered to wear an invisible stun belt by the
trial court. 8 Before jury selection, the defendant complained that the
stun belt made it problematic for him to sit comfortably. 9 In re-
sponse, the court had the belt removed, but after the completion of
voir dire, defendant's counsel objected to the use of the stun belt at
trial.' o Despite the objection and the defendant's non-disruptive be-
havior in previous proceedings, the court replied that it was "policy"
to have a defendant wear leg shackles or a stun belt in "cases of a se-
rious nature."" After trial, but outside the presence of the jury, the
defendant complained that the stun belt was causing skin irritation. 2
Thereafter, the defendant was examined by a physician, who pre-
scribed hydrocortisone cream for the irritation, but ultimately con-
cluded that the defendant was fit for trial.' 3 Following the examina-
tion, the court continued to use the stun belt, but allowed it to be
removed during breaks. 14 As a final objection, the defendant con-
tended that the use of the stun belt "infringed on [his] presumption of
innocence,"' 5 but the court reasoned that " 'an innocent man on trial
for murder is more dangerous than a guilty one.' ,,16
On appeal, Buchanan's primary claim was that the use of the
stun belt to physically restrain him violated his to due process rights
because "his ability to confer with defense counsel was adversely af-
8 Id.
9 Id. at 795 (Fahey, J., dissenting).
'0 Id. at 795.
11 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
12 Id. at 796 (Fahey, J., dissenting).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 796 (Fahey, J., dissenting).
16 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
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fected both because he was physically uncomfortable and because he
feared that the stun belt would be activated."' 7  In determining
whether the defendant's due process rights were violated, the court
analyzed the " 'three fundamental legal principles' ,18 regarding the
use of visible restraints: (1) "the presumption of innocence;" (2) "the
right to counsel;" and (3) "the interest in maintaining a dignified ju-
dicial process."' 19 With respect to the first principle, the court con-
cluded that the defendant's presumption of innocence was protected
because the stun belt was not visible to the jury, negating any sugges-
tion that he was a danger to the community.20 Secondly, the defen-
dant's right to counsel was also deemed protected because the belt
was invisible and because the court ordered a physical examination to
ensure the defendant's physical health.2  Despite the defendant's
complaints of his fear to confer with his counsel, the court stated that
the complaints were subjective and that he never stated he was, in
fact, unable to confer with his counsel.22 Lastly, the "dignity of the
judicial process was maintained" because the defendant was "treated
respectfully with regard to the use of the stun belt., 23 Although the
court determined that these legal principles were protected, it stated
that the trial court should have made it clear on the record that the
"7 Id. at 793.
18 Id. (quoting Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630 (2005)).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
22 Id. Buchanan also asserted that "he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on
defense counsel's failure to request a hearing with respect to the court's determination to re-
quire [him] to wear a stun belt," but the argument was denied because it was on record that
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stun belt would not be visible to the jury.24
Additionally, the appellate division rejected the defendant's
argument that the trial court did not have justification for ordering
him to wear a stun belt.2 5 The court reasoned that even if the trial
court did not have adequate justification, the "defendant must demon-
strate actual prejudice to establish a due process violation," because
the belt was not visible.26
The dissent acknowledged that the use of the stun belt as a
physical restraint, and its potential impediment of a defendant's con-
stitutional rights, has been a controversial issue in federal and state
courts.21 In holding that the trial court's judgment should be re-
versed, the dissent noted that it was "well settled [in New York] that
a criminal defendant may not be physically restrained in the presence
of a jury without a reasonable basis that is articulated on the re-
cord., 28 Therefore, any standard less than a reasonable basis may
constitute a reversal unless it was "clear that the jury was not preju-
diced., 29 Based on this precedent, the dissent criticized the trial court
for not directly addressing the visibility of the stun belt.3" Further-
more, the dissent concluded that the trial court's "blanket policy" re-
garding physical restraints violated the established case law in New
York and due process because it contradicted the requirement of
24 Id. at 793.
25 Id. at 794.
26 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
27 Id. at 796-97 (Fahey, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 797-98. See People v. Rouse, 591 N.E.2d 1172, 1173 (N.Y. 1992); People v.
Mendola, 140 N.E.2d 353, 356 (N.Y. 1957).
29 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
30 Id. (quoting United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1306 (11 th Cir. 2002)).
1202 [Vol. 25
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'close judicial scrutiny' " on a case-by-case determination.3'
The majority's statement that " 'an innocent man on trial for murder
is more dangerous than a guilty one' ,32 was the dissent's primary
concern. 33 It concluded that the presumption of innocence cannot be
"undermined by a desire for convenience or ... bureaucratic poli-
cies. 34 Moreover, the dissent noted that to ensure a fair trial, any
physical restraint should only be used when "there is an essential
state interest," which was not evident in this case.35
The Buchanan Court relied on the United States Supreme
Court decision in Deck v. Missouri,36 where the defendant was con-
victed of capital murder and given a death sentence after wearing leg
braces that were supposedly concealed from the jury during his
trial.37 The defendant appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court,
which affirmed the conviction, but set aside the death penalty.38 A
new sentencing proceeding was held where the defendant "was
shackled with leg irons, handcuffs, and a belly chain., 39 The defen-
dant's counsel made several objections before, during, and after voir
dire, claiming that the defendant should not remain in shackles during
the penalty phase because it would suggest to the jury that the defen-
dant was still violent or a threat.40 All of the objections were over-
31 Id.
32 Id. at 796.
33 Id. at 798 (Fahey, J., dissenting).
34 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 798 (Fahey, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 798-99.
36 544 U.S. 622 (2005).
37 Deck, 544 U.S. at 624-25.
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ruled because the court reasoned that the defendant was already con-
victed and his restraint will " 'take[] any fear out of [the jurors']
minds.' ",4 Ultimately, the defendant was sentenced to death again.42
On appeal, the defendant "sought postconviction relief from
his sentence," claiming that "his due process and equal protection
rights were violated by the trial court's requirement that he appear in
shackles. 43 The Missouri Supreme Court rejected these claims, rea-
soning that the defendant was a flight risk and that the evidence
showed he committed the murders to avoid being imprisoned.44 In
addition, the court reasoned that the jury's awareness of the restraints
was not on the record and the defendant did not actually claim that
his right to participate in the proceedings was diminished.45 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, considering two issues: (1) whether
the U.S. Constitution allows States to use visible restraints on a de-
fendant during the guilt phase of a trial; and (2) whether visible re-
straints are allowed in the penalty phase of a capital proceeding.46
The Court reversed the state supreme court's judgment, holding that
with respect to the first issue, "[t]he law has long forbidden routine
use of visible shackles during the guilt phase; it permits a State to
shackle a criminal defendant only in the presence of a special
41 Id.
42 Deck, 544 U.S. at 625.
43 Id. at 637 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states, in perti-
nent part: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." See also MO. CONST. art. 1, § 10, which states, in pertinent part: "That no per-
son shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." It also states
"that all persons are created equal and are entitled to equal rights and opportunity under the
law." Id. § 2.
44 Deck, 544 U.S. at 637 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 625.
46 Id. at 626, 630.
1204 [Vol. 25
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need., 4 7 Regarding the second issue, the Court held that defendants
cannot be visibly restrained during the penalty phase, unless there is a
case specific determination that justifies it.
48
In determining whether the visible restraints on a defendant
were allowed by the U.S. Constitution during the guilt phase, the
Court acknowledged at the outset that its holding did not apply to
proceedings that are solely before a judge, such as arraignments.49
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that its holding was supported by
common law precedent and constitutional foundation. 50  The Court
stated that the use of visible physical restraints on a defendant during
the guilt phase of a trial should be a " 'last resort,' " which "may be
overcome in a particular instance by essential state interests such as
physical security, escape prevention, or courtroom decorum."'', Even
so, the Court acknowledged that it is still unclear how much discre-
tion should be given to a trial judge and what procedural process a
court must go through before shackling a defendant.52
The Court also analyzed whether the U.S. Constitution would
allow a defendant to wear visible restraints during the penalty phase
of the trial. 53 The analysis began by highlighting the reason for the
general rule of defendants not being shackled, which is to comport
41 Id. at 626.
48 Id. at 633.
49 Deck, 544 U.S. at 626.
'0 Id. at 626-27. "[A] defendant 'must be brought to the bar without irons, or any manner
of shackles or bonds; unless there be evident danger of an escape.' " Id. at 626 (quoting 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 317, 322 (1769)). See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5 Deck, 544 U.S. at 628.
52 Id. at 627, 629.
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with the three fundamental legal principles.5 4 The defendant's pre-
sumption of innocence would be undermined by visible restraints be-
cause it would suggest to the jury that the defendant was a threat,
which would diminish "the related fairness of the factfinding proc-
ess."55  Also, the use of shackles affects the defendant's right to
counsel because it may impede the defendant's ability to freely par-
ticipate in the proceedings, such as testifying in his own defense, and
restricting communication with his counsel.56 Lastly, the preserva-
tion of a dignified judicial process would be affected by the use of
visible restraints because the objective of "respectful treatment of de-
fendants" would be undermined.57 In addition, the Court noted the
importance of accuracy in a decision "between life and death" in a
capital case.58
Despite the general rule, the Court stated that the use of
shackles may be necessary, but the particular circumstances of a case
must be considered to comport with due process.59 Ultimately, the
Court rejected Missouri's claims because the jury was aware of the
restraints to some extent, no good reason existed to shackle the de-
fendant, and the State did not prove that the shackling did not affect
the verdict because actual prejudice need not be shown by the defen-
54 Id. At common law, the primary reason for prohibiting shackling during the penalty
phase was the concern that the defendant may suffer from the pain of the restraints. Id.
55 Id. at 630. This fundamental legal principle is not of primary concern because the de-
fendant has already been convicted. Id. at 632.
56 Deck, 544 U.S. at 631.
57 id.
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dant.60 The dissent criticized the holding, stating that more emphasis
should have been put on safety in the courtrooms.61
Regardless of the holding in Deck, the federal courts are still
split "on the issues of whether and how a stun belt may be used,"
with visibility being the primary factor. 62 Some courts, including Bu-
chanan, take the position that "the use of a stun belt is prejudicial
even when it is not visible to the jury. 63 In United States v. Dur-
ham,64 the defendant was convicted of armed robbery, firearm pos-
session, and firearm possession by a convicted felon.6 5 During trial,
he was forced to wear a stun belt.66 When the defendant became
aware of the trial court's intentions, he filed a motion to prohibit the
use of the stun belt, citing safety concerns, an impeded ability to
communicate with his counsel, and the inability to facilitate in his
own defense.67 The trial court denied the motion at a pretrial hearing,
reasoning that the defendant was a " 'heightened security risk' " be-
cause of his two previous escape attempts and assurance from the
sheriff that the device was safe.68
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant claimed that
"the district court erred in requiring [him] to wear a stun belt
throughout the guilt phase of his trial." 69 The Court vacated the con-
60 Id. at 634-35.
61 Deck, 544 U.S. at 654 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
62 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (Fahey, J., dissenting).
63 id.
64 287 F.3d 1297 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
65 Durham, 287 F.3d at 1300.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1302.
61 Id. at 1302-03.
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viction, holding that the stun belt interfered with the defendant's con-
stitutional rights, even though it was not visible because, if seen, it
may suggest to the jury that the defendant needed to be under a
higher level of control. 70 Therefore, before forcing a defendant to
wear a stun belt, the trial court must, under careful judicial scrutiny,7 '
consider: "addressing factual questions related to [the stun belt's]
operation, the exploration of alternative, less problematic methods of
restraint, and a finding that the device is necessary in that particular
case for a set of reasons that can be articulated on the record. 7 2 This
analysis was not exercised by the trial court, nor was there a showing
that the error was harmless.73
Agreeing with Durham, the Ninth Circuit in Gonzalez v. Pli-
ler74 held that an evidentiary hearing regarding the use of a stun belt
must be conducted before requiring a defendant to wear one.75 In
Gonzalez, the defendant appealed the denial of his writ of habeas
corpus, claiming that requiring him to wear a stun belt violated his
due process rights.76 The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's
judgment, reasoning that the stun belt raised traditional constitutional
concerns, but with the added psychological impact of the stun belt on
a defendant, such as increased anxiety and fear, the defendant may be
discouraged from testifying.77 Therefore, the court concluded that a
70 Durham, 287 F.3d at 1305-06, 1309.
71 Id. at 1309.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 341 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2003).
75 Gonzalez, 341 F.3d at 899.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 900.
1208 [Vol. 25
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prerequisite for using a stun belt is careful judicial scrutiny as set
forth in Durham.78
In Gonzalez, the defendant wore a stun belt during jury selec-
tion and the trial, which were both decisions made by the bailiff, and
not by the trial judge. 79 The defense counsel objected to the stun belt,
claiming that the defendant did not pose a "true threat."80 The district
court overruled the objection after noting that the belt was invisible
and after the bailiff told the judge that the defendant was being unco-
operative. 81 The circuit court of appeals found several errors in this
process, highlighting that "[t]he use of physical restraints is subject to
close judicial, not law enforcement, scrutiny., 8 2 As a result, the trial
court's conversation with the bailiff did not fulfill the constitutional
requirements of judicial scrutiny, which may have been protected had
an evidentiary hearing taken place. 3
On the other hand, other federal courts have stated that "the
presumption of prejudice with the use of a stun belt applies only if
the stun belt is visible to the jury. 84 In United States v. McKissick,5
a co-defendant, Delmar Ziegler, was convicted of two counts of drug
trafficking, after a trial in which both defendants were tried to-
gether.8 6 Both defendants appealed, with Ziegler claiming that the
trial court erred in denying a mistrial "because he was prejudiced by
78 Id. at 901.
79 Id.
80 Gonzalez, 341 F.3d at 901.
8I Id. at 901-02.
82 Id. at 902.
83 ld.
84 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (Fahey, J., dissenting).
85 204 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2000).
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the use of a stun belt restraint" during his trial. 87 After voir dire, but
before the trial began, Ziegler's counsel learned that both defendants
were wearing stun belts, and argued that they should be removed be-
cause of the possible prejudice if the jury saw the belts.88 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the denial, concluding that there was no abuse of
discretion by the trial court.89 The court reasoned that they believed
other gang members would try disturb the trial, that the stun belts
were not visible to the jury, and that no record existed of any juror
being aware of the belts.90 Therefore, the court concluded that it
could not "presume prejudice to [the defendant]." 91
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
also takes this position in United States v. Edelin.92 In Edelin, the six
defendants were charged with various counts of "violent crimes and
drug related activity," but only one defendant, Tommy Edelin, faced
capital punishment. 93 Edelin, joined by four of his co-defendants,
filed a "[m]otion to preclude the use of stun belts during the trial in
[his] case," but it was orally denied by the court.9 4 The court rea-
soned that "[m]aintaining courtroom order and security is a legitimate
goal of the [c]ourt, and the use of devices that can increase the secu-
rity of the courtroom without threatening the life of any individual




9' McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1299.
92 175 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001).
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does not violate the Constitution." 95
The defendant objected to the use of the stun belts for several
reasons, including violations of his Fifth Amendment due process
rights and general safety concerns regarding the operation of the stun
belt.96 The government contended that the stun belts did not cause
any substantial health concerns and that the risk of malfunction was
low.97 The court found the government's arguments persuasive, but
also reasoned that a lack of disruptive behavior by the defendants was
not the only factor to consider. 98 Additionally, the defendants did not
complain of any actual psychological damage or inability to commu-
nicate with their counsel, and the government made a sufficient
showing of the level of danger the defendants may pose in court. 99
Furthermore, the court stated that the use of stun belts did not "shock
the conscience" of the rights asserted by the U.S. Constitution, °0 and
concluded that stun belts are a better alternative, compared to other
visible physical restraints, because they reduce the potential for
" Id. at 5.
96 Id. at 2. The defendant objected to use of the stun belts for the following reasons:
"(1) the device constitutes an unknown health threat to him and perhaps
his counsel if triggered; (2) the device is subject to malfunction and
could injure him; (3) his conduct in court during numerous previous
court appearances does not justify such an extraordinary action; (4) the
criteria for determining when to activate the device are over-broad and
vague; (5) the device is psychologically damaging to him, even if it is
not activated; (7) the device interferes with his ability to assist counsel;
and (8) there has been an appalling error rate in activating the belt in
other cases in which it has been used."
Id.
9' Id. at 3.
98 Edelin, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 3.
99 Id.




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2009
1212 TOURO LA WREVIEW [Vol. 25
prejudice by jurors.l' After weighing these various factors, 102 under
a lesser standard than careful judicial scrutiny, the court found that
the use of stun belts was appropriate for the defendants' trial. 0 3
Prior to Buchanan, New York precedent stated that "the dis-
play of a physical restraint is inherently prejudicial 'and constitutes
reversible error unless a reasonable basis therefor is in the record or it
is clear that the jury was not prejudiced thereby.' ,104 In People v.
Rouse,'0 5 the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and
attempted murder, after being forced to appear before the jury in leg
shackles at his trial. 10 6 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's ruling, holding that there was a reasonable basis articu-
lated on the record for restraining the defendant because he made
... Id. at 4.
102 Id. at 5. The court analyzed the following factors to determine whether stun belts
should be used as security measures:
(1) the seriousness of the crimes charged and the severity of the potential
sentences; (2) the numerous allegations of threats of violence made by
defendants against witnesses; (3) previous guilty pleas or convictions of
a substantial number of the defendants to prior gun charges and/or vio-
lent crimes; (4) belligerent and threatening comments made to the Dep-
uty U.S. Marshals by each of the defendants other than defendant
Tommy Edelin; (5) allegations of gang activity, and the likelihood that
associates or rivals of the alleged gang may be present at trial; (6) the
strong opinion of the U.S. Marshal for this District, particularly as it re-
lates to knowledge of security in this courthouse and with cases of this
nature; (7) potential prejudice to the defendants through the use of the
stun belts; (8) likelihood of accidental activation of the stun belts; (9) po-
tential danger to the defendants if the belts are activated; (10) the avail-
ability and viability of other means to ensure courtroom security; (11)
the potential danger for the defendants and others present in the court-
room if other means are used to secure the courtroom; and (12) the exis-
tence of a clear written policy governing the activation of stun belts worn
by defendants.
Id.
103 Edelin, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 5-6.
104 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S2d at 798 (quoting People v. Paul, 645 N.Y.S.2d 682, 683 (App.
Div. 4th Dep't 1996)).
'0' 591 N.E.2d 1172 (N.Y. 1992).
106 Rouse, 591 N.E.2d at 1173.
14
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several escape attempts prior to his trial. 0 7 Also, the court held that
although a court should "minimize the possibility of prejudice" with a
jury instruction, the defendant must request the instruction, reasoning
that a defendant may not want a jury instruction that may bring more
attention to the restraints. 0 8 Therefore, because the defendant did not
request an instruction, the court did not have an obligation to give
one. 109
In People v. Mendola,110 after two trials, the defendant was
convicted of conspiracy of aiding escape, robbery, grand larceny, and
escape from prison after he was forced to remain "handcuffed to a
deputy sheriff throughout both trials." 1" The Appellate Division,
Fourth Department reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial,
holding that handcuffing the defendant was prejudicial error even
though the evidence of record supported the conviction.'1 12 However,
the New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division's or-
der for a new trial, holding that the trial court was justified in not al-
lowing the handcuffs to be removed from the defendant."13 It rea-
soned that the defendant confessed to "his frantic desire to escape,"
and that he successfully escaped from custody before trial, so there-
fore, the precautions taken by the trial court were not excessive




110 140 N.E.2d 353 (N.Y. 1957).
... Mendola, 140 N.E.2d at 354.
112 Id.
"' Id. at 356-57.
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not stating the reasons necessary for the extreme precautionary meas-
ures on the record.' 15
Similar to the conflicts amongst federal courts, other state
courts are also split on the issue of whether stun belts should be used
as security measures and to what extent they should be used.'16 One
position taken by state courts, including New York in Buchanan, is
that "the use of a stun belt should be subjected to the same close judi-
cial scrutiny as any other restraining device, whether visible or
not."'1 7 Illinois also took this position in People v. Allen," 8 where
the defendant was convicted of burglary after he was forced to wear a
stun belt during his trial.' 1 9 The defendant appealed, and the appel-
late court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in
requiring the defendant to wear the stun belt without performing a
proper analysis beforehand.1 20 The defendant appealed to the Illinois
Supreme Court, which addressed "whether a concealed electronic
stun belt worn under a defendant's garments should be classified as a
'physical restraint' which lends itself to due process scrutiny." 12 1 The
court reversed, holding that electronic stun belts are subject to the
same type of review as other physical restraints, meaning that a
"manifest need for the restraint" must be shown before it is used. 122
Contrarily, other state courts hold that "the use of a stun belt
15 Id.
116 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
117 Id. Accord Hymon v. State, 111 P.3d 1092, 1099 (Nev. 2005) (stating that the "deci-
sion to use a stun belt is subject[ ] to close judicial scrutiny").
118 856 N.E.2d 349 (Il. 2006).
"9 Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 350-51.
20 Id. at 355.
121 Id. at 352.
122 Id. at 353.
1214 [Vol. 25
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is only prejudicial when it is visible."' 2 3 Ohio takes this position in
State v. Gulley,124 where the defendant was convicted for burglary
and theft after wearing a stun belt during trial.125 The trial court did
not hold a hearing before determining to use the stun belt, but con-
ferred with the deputy sheriff, who testified that the belt was used be-
cause of the high emotions of defendants on trial and because it was
"standard procedure." 126 In addition, the defendant agreed to wear
the belt, although there were allegations that he was tampering with
it. 127 On appeal, the defendant claimed that "the trial court abused its
discretion when it failed to hold a hearing regarding the necessity for
the stun belt," thereby violating "his constitutional rights to a fair
trial." 28 The court did not find that the trial court abused its discre-
tion by not holding a hearing before using the stun belt.
29
The court reasoned that holding a formal hearing is not a
mandatory prerequisite to using a stun belt as a security measure.
30
Furthermore, the defendant did not actually contend that his right to
assist in his own defense or his ability to communicate with his coun-
sel was infringed, and there was no evidence that the jury had knowl-
edge of the stun belt or that it was exposed. 13 1 Therefore, the defen-
dant did not prove a violation of his rights under the Ohio
123 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
124 No. CA2005-07-066, 2006 WL 1064062, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2006).





130 Gulley, 2006 WL 1064062, at *1.
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Constitution. 132
Each side of the divergence, on both the federal and state lev-
els, recognize that a defendant's due process rights have a high poten-
tial to be violated if the physical restraint is visible to the jury, which
justifies the high judicial scrutiny required before visible physical re-
straints are used. 133 It further justifies the courtroom etiquette of es-
corting the defendant into the courtroom before the jury, as to keep
restraints, such as shackles, out of the view of jurors. The courts that
follow the logic that the physical restraint is only prejudicial when
visible seem to rely on the theory that if the jury is not aware of the
stun belt, it lowers the potential for a defendant's presumption of in-
nocence to be tainted.134  On the other hand, Buchanan and other
courts do not rely on the obvious prejudice caused by visibility, but
rather concentrate on the psychological effects the belt may have on
the defendant, which may correlate into prejudice by the jury.'35 The
theory behind the close judicial scrutiny point of view is that the de-
fendant may convey anxiety or fear, through their body language, of
being shocked by the stun belt. It follows that the defendant's right
to confer with his or her counsel and to assist in his or her own de-
fense is at a higher risk of being violated.
Based on these theories, the courts favoring close judicial
scrutiny for the use of a stun belt, such as Buchanan, are more cau-
132 Id.
133 See, e.g., Rouse, 591 N.E.2d at 1173.
134 See, e.g., Gulley, 2006 WL 1064062, at *2.
135 See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002) (Tjoflat, J.,
concurring) (stating that the producer of the stun belt promotes it as able to achieve " 'total
psychological supremacy' "of the defendant)).
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tious, and ultimately follow the better practice. These courts not only
hold the defendant's constitutional rights in high regard, but place
some emphasis on the physical well-being of the defendant, which
seems to be a heated debate inside and outside the courtroom.
Aside from the defendant's constitutional right to due process
of law, the issue to be reconciled is balancing the defendant's health
and safety against maintaining safe courtrooms. Tipping the scale to
the defendant's side, the safety concerns of the stun belt are increas-
ing based on its detrimental effect during and after the shock. The
Gonzalez Court gave a detailed description of the operation and ef-
fects of the stun belt:
A stun belt is an electronic device that is secured
around a prisoner's waist. Powered by nine-volt bat-
teries, the belt is connected to prongs attached to the
wearer's left kidney region. When activated remotely,
"the belt delivers a 50,000-volt, three to four milliam-
pere shock lasting eight seconds." Upon activation of
the belt, an electric current enters the body near the
wearer's kidneys and travels along blood channels and
nerve pathways. The shock administered from the ac-
tivated belt "causes incapacitation in the first few sec-
onds and severe pain during the entire period." "Acti-
vation may also cause immediate and uncontrolled
defecation and urination, and the belt's metal prongs
may leave welts on the wearer's skin requiring as long
as six months to heal." Activation of a stun belt can
cause muscular weakness for approximately 30-45
minutes and heartbeat irregularities or seizures. Acci-
dental activations are not unknown.1
36
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Moreover, Amnesty International 137 asserts that the excruciating pain
and humiliation suffered by the defendant amounts to "cruelty."'' 38 It
further states that, in order for the stun belt to be effective, " 'it relies
on the wearer's fear of severe pain and humiliation that could follow
activation. Such fear is a leading component of the mental suffering
of a victim of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment which
is banned under international law.' ,139 In addition, when a defendant
was actually shocked, the reaction of witnesses was negative. 1
40
Weighing in favor of courtroom safety is the fear of court-
room attacks, usually resulting in innocent casualties. 141 Is " 'an in-
nocent man on trial for murder . . . more dangerous than a guilty
one?' ,142 This may be the sentiment of courts that choose the stun
belt over other alternatives, such as handcuffs, shackles, or an in-
creased number of guards present during proceedings. A proponent
of the stun belt even suggests that a better solution is for courthouses
to be "gun-free zones.' ' 143 The rationale is that courtroom shootings
137 Amnesty International USA, About Amnesty International,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/about-us/page.do?id= 1101195 ("Amnesty International under-
takes research and action focused on preventing and ending grave abuses of the rights to
physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and expression, and freedom from dis-
crimination, within the context of its work to promote all human rights.") (last visited Nov.
22, 2008).
138 Amnesty International USA, Stun Belt - Cranking Up the Cruelty, News & Events,
June 3, 1999,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=20AE047C564087A4802569000069
3289 (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
139 Id.
140 Jennifer Auther & Associated Press, Judge's Order to Shock Defendant Stuns Wit-
nesses, CNN.COM, Jul. 10, 1998, http://www.cnn.com[US/9807/1 0/stun.belts/index.html.
141 David Feige, Put Down Your Gun, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at A15.
142 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
143 Feige, supra note 141, at A15.
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will be prevented if there are no weapons for the defendants to use. 144
A part of the general problem is that courts and prisons are
straying from the original purpose for physical restraints. Stun belts
originally were used for the most dangerous prisoners and defen-
dants, but have progressively become commonplace in prisons and
courtrooms across the nation.145 For this reason, the close judicial
scrutiny standard at least places some limitation on the use of stun
belts. These limitations are now becoming increasingly important as
juveniles are being subjected to the stun belt. 1
46
Since the stun belt will, most likely, continue to be used, a
feasible balance needs to be created to protect a defendant's constitu-
tional, health, and safety concerns, and to maintain courtroom safety.
To protect a defendant's due process rights, more courts should adopt
the close judicial scrutiny standard for stun belts, as it will eliminate
the budding "blanket policies," which result in the automatic use of
the stun belt. 147 The defendant may not be completely comfortable
wearing the stun belt, but the anxiety of being shocked may be eased
with increased training for guards operating the belt, and use for ab-
solute emergencies and not minimal annoyances. 1
48
Even with these precautions, the courts have left one issue
open for debate-the pro se defendant. The majority of cases con-
cern constitutional issues regarding the defendant's inability to confer
144 Id.
145 Amnesty International USA, supra note 138.
146 Id.
147 Buchanan, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 798 (Fahey, J., dissenting).
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with counsel and assist in his or her own defense. The pro se defen-
dant poses a whole new issue because of the increased movement by
this defendant, which may lower the threshold for allowing use and
activation of the stun belt. Should there be a blanket policy for use of
the stun belts for pro se defendants? If not, good luck to the pro se
defendant trying her case in shackles.
Jacqulyn Vann
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